India’s growing military success, especially evident in recent operations like Operation Sindoor, should serve as a sharp warning to the United States. While India innovates quickly and builds cost-effective, scalable warfighting models, the US remains trapped in slow, outdated Cold War frameworks.
The contrast is stark. India’s Pinaka rocket costs less than $56,000, compared to a US GMLRS missile priced at $148,000. India rapidly developed the Akashteer missile defence system at a fraction of the cost of US-made Patriot or NASAMS platforms. Even Ukraine’s use of Iran’s $20,000 Shahed-136 drone outpaces the US MQ-9 Reaper, which costs over $30 million.
These examples highlight a fundamental problem in the American defence ecosystem. As John Spencer and Vincent Viola argue in the Small Wars Journal, “The United States is in urgent need of fundamental defense reform. Not just adjustments. Not just marginal gains. A full-scale overhaul.”
What ails US defence industry
The US defence industry is dominated by a handful of giant contractors. Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon Technologies, and General Dynamics rank among the top global arms producers. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), nine of the world’s top 20 defence firms by revenue are American, and 41 of the top 100 are US-based, as reported by Eurasian Times.
What once was a sign of strength now feels more like a cartel. Spencer and Viola warn: “America’s defense manufacturing process is dominated by a small cartel of primes that, while capable, have little incentive to drive innovation, reduce cost, or adapt quickly. There is no real market competition. This is not competition—it’s cartelized domination.”
Despite soaring defence budgets—expected to near $1 trillion by 2025—the number of prime contractors has shrunk drastically. A Department of Defense study noted that prime defence contractors fell from 51 to fewer than 10. Former President Donald Trump pointed to the problem bluntly: “Defense companies have all merged in, so it’s hard to negotiate… It’s already not competitive.”
US acquisition system: Too slow for modern war
The US acquisition process is notoriously slow. It often takes years, sometimes decades, to field new equipment. The war in Ukraine exposed this painfully. While American weapons like Javelins and HIMARS made a difference, production struggled to keep up with demand. Artillery shell shortages forced the Pentagon to rely on ageing factories and slow supply lines.
Many battlefield innovations since 9/11—such as counter-IED kits and drones—were introduced through emergency channels, bypassing formal procurement. But these stopgap measures do not fix systemic delays.
The cost trap undermining US power
Cost-plus contracting shields defence firms from the consequences of budget overruns. This system discourages innovation and encourages over-engineered, expensive platforms.
The F-35 fighter jet illustrates this problem. With a lifetime cost estimated at $1.7 trillion, it has been criticised for delays and underperformance. Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall admitted, “We’re not going to repeat what I think frankly was a serious mistake that was made in the F-35 program.” In May 2023, Kendall warned that without reform, “What that basically does is create a perpetual monopoly.”
Learning from India and others
While the US struggles to keep up, countries like India show how to innovate efficiently. India’s defence industry emphasises cost-effective, rapid development. The Akashteer system and Pinaka rockets are examples of scalable, rugged platforms built with speed and affordability in mind.
Spencer and Viola highlight the absence of “an agile, scalable, layered, fast-response production network” in the US. “There is no real surge capacity,” they write. This gap leaves America vulnerable in fast-paced modern conflicts.
A closed circle resisting change
Defence firms increasingly operate in isolation from broader markets. A 2024 study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found that 61% of major defence contracts go to companies with no commercial business. This figure rises to 86% when firms like Boeing, whose commercial work is limited, are included.
This shift began after Cold War budget cuts in the 1990s, driving consolidation and pushing commercial players out. The result is a defence industry insulated from market pressures and reluctant to innovate.
Spencer and Viola warn bluntly: “The time for US defense reform is not coming. It’s already late.”
What the US must do to stay relevant
To avoid falling behind, the US must rebuild its defence acquisition process around speed, iteration, and frontline feedback—not decade-long static programmes. It needs to break up industrial monopolies or foster genuine competition and alternative suppliers.
Equally important is treating allies like India and Israel as co-equal production partners, not merely buyers or technology recipients.
A White House executive order last month recognised this. “Unfortunately, after years of misplaced priorities and poor management, our defense acquisition system does not provide the speed and flexibility our Armed Forces need to have decisive advantages in the future,” it said. The order directed the Secretary of Defense to deliver a reform plan within 60 days.
But reform cannot stop at factories and procurement cycles. The US should establish permanent, deployable learning teams embedded in conflict zones and logistics hubs. These teams would gather battlefield lessons directly and feed them back into system design—making the US defence ecosystem “the most efficient, adaptable, and dominant in the world.”
Facing the challenge from China
China poses the biggest challenge. It has the largest active military force globally, with approximately two million soldiers and a population more than four times that of the US.
Winning future wars will not be about who has the biggest army. It will depend on who can innovate faster, produce economically, and fight at speed.
“Wars will be won by those who can think faster, build faster, and fight smarter—and above all, by those who master the physics of lethality required on the modern battlefield,” Spencer and Viola conclude.
For the US to lead again, it must not only revive its defence industrial power but also master lethality at scale, speed, and sustainability. The clock is ticking.
The contrast is stark. India’s Pinaka rocket costs less than $56,000, compared to a US GMLRS missile priced at $148,000. India rapidly developed the Akashteer missile defence system at a fraction of the cost of US-made Patriot or NASAMS platforms. Even Ukraine’s use of Iran’s $20,000 Shahed-136 drone outpaces the US MQ-9 Reaper, which costs over $30 million.
These examples highlight a fundamental problem in the American defence ecosystem. As John Spencer and Vincent Viola argue in the Small Wars Journal, “The United States is in urgent need of fundamental defense reform. Not just adjustments. Not just marginal gains. A full-scale overhaul.”
What ails US defence industry
The US defence industry is dominated by a handful of giant contractors. Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon Technologies, and General Dynamics rank among the top global arms producers. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), nine of the world’s top 20 defence firms by revenue are American, and 41 of the top 100 are US-based, as reported by Eurasian Times.
What once was a sign of strength now feels more like a cartel. Spencer and Viola warn: “America’s defense manufacturing process is dominated by a small cartel of primes that, while capable, have little incentive to drive innovation, reduce cost, or adapt quickly. There is no real market competition. This is not competition—it’s cartelized domination.”
Despite soaring defence budgets—expected to near $1 trillion by 2025—the number of prime contractors has shrunk drastically. A Department of Defense study noted that prime defence contractors fell from 51 to fewer than 10. Former President Donald Trump pointed to the problem bluntly: “Defense companies have all merged in, so it’s hard to negotiate… It’s already not competitive.”
US acquisition system: Too slow for modern war
The US acquisition process is notoriously slow. It often takes years, sometimes decades, to field new equipment. The war in Ukraine exposed this painfully. While American weapons like Javelins and HIMARS made a difference, production struggled to keep up with demand. Artillery shell shortages forced the Pentagon to rely on ageing factories and slow supply lines.
Many battlefield innovations since 9/11—such as counter-IED kits and drones—were introduced through emergency channels, bypassing formal procurement. But these stopgap measures do not fix systemic delays.
The cost trap undermining US power
Cost-plus contracting shields defence firms from the consequences of budget overruns. This system discourages innovation and encourages over-engineered, expensive platforms.
The F-35 fighter jet illustrates this problem. With a lifetime cost estimated at $1.7 trillion, it has been criticised for delays and underperformance. Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall admitted, “We’re not going to repeat what I think frankly was a serious mistake that was made in the F-35 program.” In May 2023, Kendall warned that without reform, “What that basically does is create a perpetual monopoly.”
Learning from India and others
While the US struggles to keep up, countries like India show how to innovate efficiently. India’s defence industry emphasises cost-effective, rapid development. The Akashteer system and Pinaka rockets are examples of scalable, rugged platforms built with speed and affordability in mind.
Spencer and Viola highlight the absence of “an agile, scalable, layered, fast-response production network” in the US. “There is no real surge capacity,” they write. This gap leaves America vulnerable in fast-paced modern conflicts.
A closed circle resisting change
Defence firms increasingly operate in isolation from broader markets. A 2024 study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found that 61% of major defence contracts go to companies with no commercial business. This figure rises to 86% when firms like Boeing, whose commercial work is limited, are included.
This shift began after Cold War budget cuts in the 1990s, driving consolidation and pushing commercial players out. The result is a defence industry insulated from market pressures and reluctant to innovate.
Spencer and Viola warn bluntly: “The time for US defense reform is not coming. It’s already late.”
What the US must do to stay relevant
To avoid falling behind, the US must rebuild its defence acquisition process around speed, iteration, and frontline feedback—not decade-long static programmes. It needs to break up industrial monopolies or foster genuine competition and alternative suppliers.
Equally important is treating allies like India and Israel as co-equal production partners, not merely buyers or technology recipients.
A White House executive order last month recognised this. “Unfortunately, after years of misplaced priorities and poor management, our defense acquisition system does not provide the speed and flexibility our Armed Forces need to have decisive advantages in the future,” it said. The order directed the Secretary of Defense to deliver a reform plan within 60 days.
But reform cannot stop at factories and procurement cycles. The US should establish permanent, deployable learning teams embedded in conflict zones and logistics hubs. These teams would gather battlefield lessons directly and feed them back into system design—making the US defence ecosystem “the most efficient, adaptable, and dominant in the world.”
Facing the challenge from China
China poses the biggest challenge. It has the largest active military force globally, with approximately two million soldiers and a population more than four times that of the US.
Winning future wars will not be about who has the biggest army. It will depend on who can innovate faster, produce economically, and fight at speed.
“Wars will be won by those who can think faster, build faster, and fight smarter—and above all, by those who master the physics of lethality required on the modern battlefield,” Spencer and Viola conclude.
For the US to lead again, it must not only revive its defence industrial power but also master lethality at scale, speed, and sustainability. The clock is ticking.
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